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LABOR LAW IN MISSOURI-1957-1958*
As-usT

F.

SHuTE**

The appellate courts of Missouri were singularly free from labor
cases during the past year, having to decide only three. This may well be
indicative of a trend among unions and management to settle their difficulties outside of the courtroom because of the recession and lay-off of
large numbers of hourly paid employees. When economic conditions are
like they are at present, neither particularly good nor particularly bad,
unions and management seem more inclined to settle most of their
disputes over the bargaining table rather than to risk or encourage a work
stoppage.
1
involved one aspect of
Cook v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
a union-shop contract. Does an employee have to join and belong to the
local union under such a union-shop contract, and if he refuses, will he be
discharged? The answer to both of these questions was in the affirmative.

Fourteen employees of the Missouri Pacific Railroad filed this suit
in equity to restrain their discharges by the company for failure to join
the defendant union within the period allowed. The fourteen were
members of a dissident union at the time the union-shop contract was
entered into between the railroad and the brotherhood. In the contract,
continued employment with the railroad was made dependent on the
individual employees becoming members of the union within a sixth day
period.
Petitioners refused to join, even though the union offered them the
chance to join long after the sixty day period had passed. Various appeal
steps within the Railway Labor Act 2 were taken by petitioners, including
an appeal to the National Mediation Board. The arbitrator appointed by
the Mediation Board found that the petitioners had violated the contract
and were subject to termination.

*This Article contains a discussion of selected recent Missouri court decisions.
**Attorney, Kansas City; AJB., University of Missouri, 1950, LL.3., 1952.
1. 309 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1958).
2. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1952).
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Petitioners then forwarded their membership dues under protest,
but the union refused to accept them. This suit was filed to restrain
their threatened discharges. No further steps were taken under the
Railway Labor Act.
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and this
finding was sustained by the supreme court. In tracing the background
of the Railway Labor Act, the court pointed out that Congress had left
only a minimum of responsibility and jurisdiction to the courts, state or
federal, in the field of railway labor relations.3 The courts have consistently declined jurisdiction in this type of case, where the members of a
rival union protest that they must join the designated bargaining unit and
have sought reinstatement when discharged for failure to join.
The court pointed out, "generally speaking, when the accredited
bargaining agent executes a union shop contract (or other collective
bargaining agreement) it is binding on all members of the bargaining unit,
4
whether members of the union or not."
As to the petitioners' contention that they could not get a fair hearing
before the adjustment board, because it would consist of equal representation between the brotherhood and the carrier, the court stated:
We cannot presume prejudice or bias in a congressionally created
tribunal. And the plaintiffs may, in person or by attorney,
present their own grievances to the Adjustment Board, if the
Brotherhood is unwilling to do so.... The Board has the power
to order reinstatement as well as to grant money awards....
Many of the cited cases hold that the courts may not assume
jurisdiction when the complaining parties have not exhausted
their administrative remedies ....

In fact, substantially every

decision in which the court has declined jurisdiction has been
based upon the holding that jurisdiction was relegated by Congress to the administrative agencies, which is merely another
way of saying the same thing...5
The case of Swift & Co. v. Doe 6 involved organizational picketing of
a meat packing plant. In an attempt to organize the white collar salesmen
employed by packing houses, pickets were placed at the transportation

3.
4.
5.
6.

Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
309 S.W.2d at 587.
Id. at 590.
311 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1958).
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entrances to the packing house. The result of the picketing was to make it
difficult for plaintiff to make delivery of its products to retail outlets.
Thereafter, plaintiff applied for and received a restraining order against
the picketing.
In its petition for a restraining order, plaintiff alleged that it was
engaged in interstate commerce, and that violations of the Taft-Hartley
Act 7 as well as Missouri law 8 were involved. The picketing was
admittedly peaceful.
The plaintiff, while this case was pending, had filed two unfair labor
practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.9 One charge
was dismissed, but the other one, involving allegations of a secondary
boycott was sustained, and a cease and desist order issued.
The court determined that the real and fundamental issue tried in the
trial court was whether or not the picketing was unlawful in that it was
for the purpose of forcing plaintiff to coerce its salesmen into joining the
union, and selecting it as their bargaining representative, contrary to the
provision of section 29 of the Missouri constitution. Citing Quinn v.
Buchanan,10 and Beflerive Country Club v. McVey," the court stated,
"in that connection it may be stated that we have repeatedly held that
picketing for that purpose is violative of the free choice guaranteed to

employees by Section 29.'.12
In holding that it did not have appellate jurisdiction of the case, the
court pointed out that it would be necessary for the appeal to involve the
validity of a statute of the United States or the validity of authority
exercised under the laws of the United States. Such was not the case
here. Thus, the case was transferred to the court of appeals.
The final labor case dealt with by the supreme court was Glidewell v.
Hughey,13 which was a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration
of rights between a union and the City of Springfield, Missouri, under

7. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61

STAT.

136 (1947), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1952).
8. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 29.
9. Alleging violations by the union of Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley Act), §§ 8 (b) (1) (A), (b) (2), (b) (4), 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(b) (1) (A), (b) (2), (b) (4) (1952).
10. 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
1l. 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492 (1955) (en banc).
12. 311 S.W.2d at 21.
13. 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
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article 16 of the city charter of that city. The trial court had found that
the King-Thompson Act' 4 applied both to privately and publicly owned

utilities, and that the State Board of Mediation, created by the KingThompson Act, had jurisdiction to use its mediation services in labor disputes between the Board of Public Utilities of the City of Springfield and
its employees. It further found that the city, acting through the Board of
Public Utilities, had the power to enter into collective bargaining agreements with its employees relating to wages, hours and working conditions.
Since the employees were under a merit system, however, such collective
bargaining agreements could not provide for a closed or union shop,
seniority, or recognition of the union as bargaining agent for employees
other than those belonging to the union.
The union argued that the limitations thus placed on their bargaining
power were erroneous, although agreeing that the mediation board had
jurisdiction over their disputes. The supreme court stated that the real
issue in the case was whether or not, under the present city charter,
wages, hours and working conditions of municipal employees could be a
matter of bargaining and contract to any extent at all.
The court found that there was no separation of the corporate functions of the city concerning its public utilities and the employees engaged
therein and other city functions. Under the city charter, the Board of
Public Utilities was not set up as a separate municipal corporation but is
merely an administrative body of the municipal government itself. This
differentiates this case from the type of separation referred to in State
ex rel. Moore v. Julian'5 and City of Springfield v. Clouse'6 where there
was provision for operation of the utilities involved in some manner
distinctly different from the ordinary functions of municipal government.
The court held that under the present city charter of Springfield,
the whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working
conditions in the city's public utilities involves the exercise of legislative
powers and cannot become a matter of bargaining and contract. The
court further held:
As to the jurisdiction of the State Board of Mediation, we think it
must be held that it has no jurisdiction in municipalities in which
14. C. 295, RSMo 1949.
15. 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720 (1949) (en banc).
16. 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) (en banc).
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there is no separation of municipally owned public utilities with
provision for their operation in some manner distinctly apart
from other city functions so that their employer and employee
relations could be handled on a basis similar to private indust...

17

This completes the review of recent labor law cases in Missouri
through July 1958. It does not appear that any new or startling law was
written during the period under review.

17. 314 S.W.2d at 756.
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